Rumsfeld ritratta su Saddam-Al Qaeda

[GioFX]

Originariamente inviato da SaMu
Ti ho chiesto: quando avrebbero dovuto farlo, nel 1991 quando erano già in ballo?

Quando erano in ballo... ma chi?!?

Se ti riferisci agli Stati Uniti, certo... se era quello il loro intento, eliminare Saddam, hanno fallito... potevano farlo nel momento più opportuno, e invece se ne sono guardati bene, loro e i loro alleati dell'Occidente della Libertà.

Non c'è bisogno che fai operetta, mi bastava solo un si o un no ma forse chiedere questo a un fan di Kerry è chiedere troppo

Se me la spieghi magari mi unisco al party delle cazzate pure io...

[SaMu]

Originariamente inviato da GioFX
Quando erano in ballo... ma chi?!?

Se ti riferisci agli Stati Uniti, certo... se era quello il loro intento, eliminare Saddam, hanno fallito... potevano farlo nel momento più opportuno, e invece se ne sono guardati bene, loro e i loro alleati dell'Occidente della Libertà.

Ma tu nel 1991 eri favorevole alla guerra del golfo?

[Paracleto]

"A brutal, oppressive dictator, guilty of personally murdering and condoning murder and torture, grotesque violence against women, execution of political opponents, a war criminal who used chemical weapons against another nation and, of course, as we know, against his own people, the Kurds. He has diverted funds from the Oil-for-Food program, intended by the international community to go to his own people. He has supported and harbored terrorist groups, particularly radical Palestinian groups such as Abu Nidal, and he has given money to families of suicide murderers in Israel".


John Kerry, 10 ottobre 2002, intervento al Senato nell'argomentare il suo voto favorevole all'uso della forza in Iraq.



"We cannot allow Saddam Hussein to get nuclear weapons in violation of his own commitments, our commitments, and the world's commitments".

John Edwards, 9 ottobre 2002, intervento al Senato nell'argomentare il suo voto favorevole all'uso della forza in Iraq.

[andreamarra]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto
"A brutal, oppressive dictator, guilty of personally murdering and condoning murder and torture, grotesque violence against women, execution of political opponents, a war criminal who used chemical weapons against another nation and, of course, as we know, against his own people, the Kurds. He has diverted funds from the Oil-for-Food program, intended by the international community to go to his own people. He has supported and harbored terrorist groups, particularly radical Palestinian groups such as Abu Nidal, and he has given money to families of suicide murderers in Israel".


John Kerry, 10 ottobre 2002, intervento al Senato nell'argomentare il suo voto favorevole all'uso della forza in Iraq.



"We cannot allow Saddam Hussein to get nuclear weapons in violation of his own commitments, our commitments, and the world's commitments".

John Edwards, 9 ottobre 2002, intervento al Senato nell'argomentare il suo voto favorevole all'uso della forza in Iraq.

Anch'io credevo che ci fossero armi di distruzione di massa. Adesso che so che non sono state trovate, modifico il mio parere.

Che poi Kerry adesso dica questo per prendere voti, è palese.

Fa parte della politica, purtroppo.

Resta però il fatto che le reali motivazioni dell'attacco erano presumibilmente altre. La storia ci dirà se sarà stato un bene, o un male.

[Paracleto]

A questo punto, data per certa l'assenza di Armi di Distruzione di Massa, rimane una considerazione: perchè se Saddam non le aveva, ha deliberatamente disatteso le (16) risoluzioni dell'Onu? Perchè ha cacciato gli ispettori nel '98? Perchè ha sviluppato missili con una gittata più lunga di quella consentita? se il suo obiettivo non era nascondere le ADM, ma sfidare gli Usa, ci è riuscito. Gli è andata male, ha perso. E allora, qual'è il problema? La comunità internazionale avrebbe dovuto piegarsi di fronte alle provocazioni di Saddam? creare il precedente (come a Monaco nel '38) di potersi fare beffe degli obblighi internazionali? Si accomodi, chi vuole fare sua questa tesi. Ma ricordi: Saddam era anni che non adempiva alle risoluzioni Onu, che prevedevano termmini temporali precisi per essere soddisfatte. E il rinvio era di per sè una violazione delle risoluzioni Onu.

[GioFX]

Originariamente inviato da SaMu
Ma tu nel 1991 eri favorevole alla guerra del golfo?

Si, anche se rimango convinto che non sia stato fatto tutto il possibile per impedire a Saddam di non invadere il Kuwait... ma volevo che venisse rimosso Saddam, dovendo utilizzare la forza, cosa che, naturalmente, non si voleva fare.

[jumpermax]

Originariamente inviato da GioFX
Si, anche se rimango convinto che non sia stato fatto tutto il possibile per impedire a Saddam di non invadere il Kuwait... ma volevo che venisse rimosso Saddam, dovendo utilizzare la forza, cosa che, naturalmente, non si voleva fare.

e i motivi per cui volevi fosse rimosso nel 91 sono venuti meno col passare degli anni?

[GioFX]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto
"A brutal, oppressive dictator, guilty of personally murdering and condoning murder and torture, grotesque violence against women, execution of political opponents, a war criminal who used chemical weapons against another nation and, of course, as we know, against his own people, the Kurds. He has diverted funds from the Oil-for-Food program, intended by the international community to go to his own people. He has supported and harbored terrorist groups, particularly radical Palestinian groups such as Abu Nidal, and he has given money to families of suicide murderers in Israel".


John Kerry, 10 ottobre 2002, intervento al Senato nell'argomentare il suo voto favorevole all'uso della forza in Iraq.



"We cannot allow Saddam Hussein to get nuclear weapons in violation of his own commitments, our commitments, and the world's commitments".

John Edwards, 9 ottobre 2002, intervento al Senato nell'argomentare il suo voto favorevole all'uso della forza in Iraq.

Da Washingtonpost.com:

Rumsfeld Visited Baghdad in 1984 to Reassure Iraqis, Documents Show

Trip Followed Criticism Of Chemical Arms' Use

By Dana Priest
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, December 19, 2003; Page A42

Donald H. Rumsfeld went to Baghdad in March 1984 with instructions to deliver a private message about weapons of mass destruction: that the United States' public criticism of Iraq for using chemical weapons would not derail Washington's attempts to forge a better relationship, according to newly declassified documents.

Rumsfeld, then President Ronald Reagan's special Middle East envoy, was urged to tell Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that the U.S. statement on chemical weapons, or CW, "was made strictly out of our strong opposition to the use of lethal and incapacitating CW, wherever it occurs," according to a cable to Rumsfeld from then-Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

The statement, the cable said, was not intended to imply a shift in policy, and the U.S. desire "to improve bilateral relations, at a pace of Iraq's choosing," remained "undiminished." "This message bears reinforcing during your discussions."

The documents, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the nonprofit National Security Archive, provide new, behind-the-scenes details of U.S. efforts to court Iraq as an ally even as it used chemical weapons in its war with Iran.

An earlier trip by Rumsfeld to Baghdad, in December 1983, has been widely reported as having helped persuade Iraq to resume diplomatic ties with the United States. An explicit purpose of Rumsfeld's return trip in March 1984, the once-secret documents reveal for the first time, was to ease the strain created by a U.S. condemnation of chemical weapons.

The documents do not show what Rumsfeld said in his meetings with Aziz, only what he was instructed to say. It would be highly unusual for a presidential envoy to have ignored direct instructions from Shultz.

When details of Rumsfeld's December trip came to light last year, the defense secretary told CNN that he had "cautioned" Saddam Hussein about the use of chemical weapons, an account that was at odds with the declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting, which did not mention such a caution. Later, a Pentagon spokesman said Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Aziz.

Pentagon spokesman Larry Di Rita said yesterday that "the secretary said what he said, and I would go with that. He has a recollection of how that meeting went, and I can't imagine that some additional cable is going to change how he recalls the meeting."

"I don't think it has to be inconsistent," Di Rita said. "You could make a strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, or any kind of lethal agents, and then say, with that in mind, 'Here's another set of issues' " to be discussed.

Last year, the Bush administration cited its belief that Iraq had and would use weapons of mass destruction -- including chemical, biological and nuclear devices -- as the principal reason for going to war.

But throughout 1980s, while Iraq was fighting a prolonged war with Iran, the United States saw Hussein's government as an important ally and bulwark against the militant Shiite extremism seen in the 1979 revolution in Iran. Washington worried that the Iranian example threatened to destabilize friendly monarchies in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Publicly, the United States maintained neutrality during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, which began in 1980.

Privately, however, the administrations of Reagan and George H.W. Bush sold military goods to Iraq, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological agents, worked to stop the flow of weapons to Iran, and undertook discreet diplomatic initiatives, such as the two Rumsfeld trips to Baghdad, to improve relations with Hussein.

Tom Blanton, executive director of the National Security Archives, a Washington-based research center, said the secret support for Hussein offers a lesson for U.S. foreign relations in the post-Sept. 11 world.

"The dark corners of diplomacy deserve some scrutiny, and people working in places like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Uzbekistan deserve this kind of scrutiny, too, because the relations we're having with dictators today will produce Saddams tomorrow."

Shultz, in his instructions to Rumsfeld, underscored the confusion that the conflicting U.S. signals were creating for Iraq.

"Iraqi officials have professed to be at a loss to explain our actions as measured against our stated objectives," he wrote. "As with our CW statement, their temptation is to give up rational analysis and retreat to the line that U.S. policies are basically anti-Arab and hostage to the desires of Israel."

The declassified documents also show the hope of another senior diplomat, the British ambassador to Iraq, in working constructively with Hussein.

Shortly after Hussein became deputy to the president in 1969, then-British Ambassador H.G. Balfour Paul cabled back his impressions after a first meeting: "I should judge him, young as he is, to be a formidable, single-minded and hard-headed member of the Ba'athist hierarchy, but one with whom, if only one could see more of him, it would be possible to do business."

"A presentable young man" with "an engaging smile," Paul wrote. "Initially regarded as a [Baath] Party extremist, but responsibility may mellow him."

****

Da Wall Street Journal:

The ICC Can Serve the U.S.

by Samantha Power
July 10, 2002

U.S. officials and United Nations diplomats this week resumed their high-stakes game of chicken over the future of the newly-minted International Criminal Court. With a July 15 deadline fast approaching for extending the U.N. mission in Bosnia, the Bush administration is threatening to yank U.S. support from this and all peacekeeping operations around the world if U.S. soldiers are not granted immunity from the ICC. The administration fears that, absent such immunity, anti-American judges will haul our soldiers into the dock.

Court supporters argue these worries are unfounded. For an American to be tried, a panel of eminent international judges would have to charge that he or she had carried out genocide, "systematic and widespread" crimes against humanity or war crimes. Only if the U.S. justice system itself then refused to investigate these alleged attacks would the ICC be able to proceed.

Until the court becomes functional and proves itself, neither side will be able to prove its point. But while the Bush administration focuses on the risks posed by the court, it has devoted virtually no time considering the ways the ICC could benefit the U.S.

In fact, as is illustrated by two recent cases of genocide -- Iraq's brutal campaign against the Kurds in 1988 and the Serb assault against the Bosnian Muslims in 1992-1995 -- U.S. interests are greatly undermined by policies antithetical to American values. And U.S. security will best be advanced if genocide and crimes against humanity are suppressed and their perpetrators punished. The ICC can be an important tool in achieving that end.

In a six-month campaign in 1988, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein systematically gassed and machine-gunned Kurds in northern Iraq, killing 100,000 Kurds and bulldozing some 1,000 villages. The first Bush administration viewed Iraq as a bulwark against Iran, and reasoned that the way Saddam acted inside his own borders was his own business. In 1988, while Saddam was carrying out the gas attacks, the U.S. provided Baghdad some $500 million in credits to buy American farm products. The year after the genocidal campaign, the U.S. doubled its contribution to Saddam's coffers, offering $1 billion in credits.

"Human rights and chemical weapons use aside," one shockingly misguided secret State Department assessment said, "in many respects our political and economic interests run parallel with those of Iraq." Chemical weapons use aside?

In 1990, emboldened by his ability to get away with literal murder, Saddam invaded Kuwait. Because the occupation threatened U.S. oil supplies, the Bush administration of course changed course. Mr. Bush detailed the horrors that he had previously ignored and threatened Nuremberg-style trials. "Saddam Hussein must know the stakes are high, the cause is just, and today more than ever, the determination is real," the president declared.

There was just one problem: No such court existed. But suppose the ICC had already been established. Saddam's genocide against the Kurds would certainly have earned him and his top officials indictments. If U.S. forces had ventured to Baghdad in 1991 -- or if they were to reach the Iraqi capital this year -- they would carry a list of indictees prepared by a panel of independent judges. The arrests and the subsequent ICC trials would have far greater credibility internationally than any that might be carried out at U.S. bidding. The trials would also rid postwar Iraq of many of its most ruthless officials, a purge that would spur the development of the rule of law. The U.S. role in law enforcement would have all the more standing because the U.S., too, had accepted court jurisdiction.

In the case of Bosnia, while militant Serbs ethnically cleansed and murdered their way through 70% of the country in 1992, the Bush administration concluded it had "no dog" in the fight. But eventually editorial and elite pressure at home convinced George H.W. Bush that he could not do nothing. In December 1992 Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger named leading war crimes suspects in the Balkans, and publicly warned that a "second Nuremberg" awaited them.

But again there was a catch: No court existed. Thus, the most noxious, bloodthirsty thugs in the region continued to prosper, hijacking the negotiation process, murdering U.N. peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers, and dragging on the bloody war.

President Clinton proved no more willing than his predecessor to confront the Serbs. Walking away from his campaign pledge to bomb the Serbs and lift an arms embargo against the outgunned Bosnian Muslims, Mr. Clinton instead pressed for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal.

But when the ad hoc UN court came into existence in 1994, two years into the Bosnian war, it deterred no one. How could it? Ad hoc tribunals are slapdash creations that have to raise money, hire staff, establish rules, and earn credibility. All of his takes time -- time that murderers exploit. While the court issued indictments during the war, the Serbs knew that Western troops were unwilling to risk casualties by making arrests. The massacres continued, the war criminals were feted at peace talks in Western capitals, and the toothless U.N. court came to symbolize Western apathy.

As in Iraq, however, allowing genocide in the Balkans proved costly to the U.S. As the clock ticked, some of the desperate Bosnian Muslims began to radicalize, as they deduced that their only hope of rescue lay with Islamic extremists. For the last two years of the Bosnian war, while the indicted war criminals roamed free, Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups used Bosnia as a training base. While the U.S. and its allies were bystanders to genocide, bin Laden traveled on a Bosnian passport.

The U.N. court gradually earned its keep. Once NATO troops proved themselves willing to stage daring arrest raids, beginning in 1997, panicked indictees began turning themselves in. Forty-seven of the most dangerous men in southeastern Europe are currently behind U.N. bars. Hundreds, perhaps even thousands, who have blood on their hands have been driven underground, afraid that they may have been secretly indicted. If the U.N. tribunal did not exist, these killers and bandits would otherwise be spending their days tormenting NATO peacekeepers and threatening returning refugees.

With the permanent International Criminal Court no more than a week old, it is far too early to assume it will become the virulently anti-American institution that administration officials fear. The best way for the U.S. to guard against this is to reserve self-fulfilling judgment and work with the court to supply advice on personnel and procedures.

What one can say with certainty is that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes will abound in the next decade. And the ICC -- because it is permanent and not ad hoc -- can play an indispensable role punishing and incapacitating war criminals and thus deterring future atrocities -- atrocities that typically come back to haunt the U.S.


****

Da Washingtonpost.com:

U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup

Trade in Chemical Arms Allowed Despite Their Use on Iranians, Kurds

By Michael Dobbs
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, December 30, 2002; Page A01

High on the Bush administration's list of justifications for war against Iraq are President Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons, nuclear and biological programs, and his contacts with international terrorists. What U.S. officials rarely acknowledge is that these offenses date back to a period when Hussein was seen in Washington as a valued ally.

Among the people instrumental in tilting U.S. policy toward Baghdad during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war was Donald H. Rumsfeld, now defense secretary, whose December 1983 meeting with Hussein as a special presidential envoy paved the way for normalization of U.S.-Iraqi relations. Declassified documents show that Rumsfeld traveled to Baghdad at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons on an "almost daily" basis in defiance of international conventions.

The story of U.S. involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before his 1990 attack on Kuwait -- which included large-scale intelligence sharing, supply of cluster bombs through a Chilean front company, and facilitating Iraq's acquisition of chemical and biological precursors -- is a topical example of the underside of U.S. foreign policy. It is a world in which deals can be struck with dictators, human rights violations sometimes overlooked, and accommodations made with arms proliferators, all on the principle that the "enemy of my enemy is my friend."

Throughout the 1980s, Hussein's Iraq was the sworn enemy of Iran, then still in the throes of an Islamic revolution. U.S. officials saw Baghdad as a bulwark against militant Shiite extremism and the fall of pro-American states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Jordan -- a Middle East version of the "domino theory" in Southeast Asia. That was enough to turn Hussein into a strategic partner and for U.S. diplomats in Baghdad to routinely refer to Iraqi forces as "the good guys," in contrast to the Iranians, who were depicted as "the bad guys."

A review of thousands of declassified government documents and interviews with former policymakers shows that U.S. intelligence and logistical support played a crucial role in shoring up Iraqi defenses against the "human wave" attacks by suicidal Iranian troops. The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.

Opinions differ among Middle East experts and former government officials about the pre-Iraqi tilt, and whether Washington could have done more to stop the flow to Baghdad of technology for building weapons of mass destruction.

"It was a horrible mistake then, but we have got it right now," says Kenneth M. Pollack, a former CIA military analyst and author of "The Threatening Storm," which makes the case for war with Iraq. "My fellow [CIA] analysts and I were warning at the time that Hussein was a very nasty character. We were constantly fighting the State Department."

"Fundamentally, the policy was justified," argues David Newton, a former U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, who runs an anti-Hussein radio station in Prague. "We were concerned that Iraq should not lose the war with Iran, because that would have threatened Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Our long-term hope was that Hussein's government would become less repressive and more responsible."

What makes present-day Hussein different from the Hussein of the 1980s, say Middle East experts, is the mellowing of the Iranian revolution and the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait that transformed the Iraqi dictator, almost overnight, from awkward ally into mortal enemy. In addition, the United States itself has changed. As a result of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. policymakers take a much more alarmist view of the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

U.S. Shifts in Iran-Iraq War

When the Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980, with an Iraqi attack across the Shatt al Arab waterway that leads to the Persian Gulf, the United States was a bystander. The United States did not have diplomatic relations with either Baghdad or Tehran. U.S. officials had almost as little sympathy for Hussein's dictatorial brand of Arab nationalism as for the Islamic fundamentalism espoused by Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As long as the two countries fought their way to a stalemate, nobody in Washington was disposed to intervene.

By the summer of 1982, however, the strategic picture had changed dramatically. After its initial gains, Iraq was on the defensive, and Iranian troops had advanced to within a few miles of Basra, Iraq's second largest city. U.S. intelligence information suggested the Iranians might achieve a breakthrough on the Basra front, destabilizing Kuwait, the Gulf states, and even Saudi Arabia, thereby threatening U.S. oil supplies.

"You have to understand the geostrategic context, which was very different from where we are now," said Howard Teicher, a former National Security Council official, who worked on Iraqi policy during the Reagan administration. "Realpolitik dictated that we act to prevent the situation from getting worse."

To prevent an Iraqi collapse, the Reagan administration supplied battlefield intelligence on Iranian troop buildups to the Iraqis, sometimes through third parties such as Saudi Arabia. The U.S. tilt toward Iraq was enshrined in National Security Decision Directive 114 of Nov. 26, 1983, one of the few important Reagan era foreign policy decisions that still remains classified. According to former U.S. officials, the directive stated that the United States would do "whatever was necessary and legal" to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran.

The presidential directive was issued amid a flurry of reports that Iraqi forces were using chemical weapons in their attempts to hold back the Iranians. In principle, Washington was strongly opposed to chemical warfare, a practice outlawed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In practice, U.S. condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical weapons ranked relatively low on the scale of administration priorities, particularly compared with the all-important goal of preventing an Iranian victory.

Thus, on Nov. 1, 1983, a senior State Department official, Jonathan T. Howe, told Secretary of State George P. Shultz that intelligence reports showed that Iraqi troops were resorting to "almost daily use of CW" against the Iranians. But the Reagan administration had already committed itself to a large-scale diplomatic and political overture to Baghdad, culminating in several visits by the president's recently appointed special envoy to the Middle East, Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Secret talking points prepared for the first Rumsfeld visit to Baghdad enshrined some of the language from NSDD 114, including the statement that the United States would regard "any major reversal of Iraq's fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West." When Rumsfeld finally met with Hussein on Dec. 20, he told the Iraqi leader that Washington was ready for a resumption of full diplomatic relations, according to a State Department report of the conversation. Iraqi leaders later described themselves as "extremely pleased" with the Rumsfeld visit, which had "elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level."

In a September interview with CNN, Rumsfeld said he "cautioned" Hussein about the use of chemical weapons, a claim at odds with declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting with the Iraqi leader. A Pentagon spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department notes show that he mentioned it largely in passing as one of several matters that "inhibited" U.S. efforts to assist Iraq.

Rumsfeld has also said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq in its war against Iran. Although former U.S. officials agree that Rumsfeld was not one of the architects of the Reagan administration's tilt toward Iraq -- he was a private citizen when he was appointed Middle East envoy -- the documents show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. Washington was willing to resume diplomatic relations immediately, but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the following year.

As part of its opening to Baghdad, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982, despite heated objections from Congress. Without such a move, Teicher says, it would have been "impossible to take even the modest steps we were contemplating" to channel assistance to Baghdad. Iraq -- along with Syria, Libya and South Yemen -- was one of four original countries on the list, which was first drawn up in 1979.

Some former U.S. officials say that removing Iraq from the terrorism list provided an incentive to Hussein to expel the Palestinian guerrilla leader Abu Nidal from Baghdad in 1983. On the other hand, Iraq continued to play host to alleged terrorists throughout the '80s. The most notable was Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front, who found refuge in Baghdad after being expelled from Tunis for masterminding the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro, which resulted in the killing of an elderly American tourist.

Iraq Lobbies for Arms

While Rumsfeld was talking to Hussein and Aziz in Baghdad, Iraqi diplomats and weapons merchants were fanning out across Western capitals for a diplomatic charm offensive-cum-arms buying spree. In Washington, the key figure was the Iraqi chargé d'affaires, Nizar Hamdoon, a fluent English speaker who impressed Reagan administration officials as one of the most skillful lobbyists in town.

"He arrived with a blue shirt and a white tie, straight out of the mafia," recalled Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East specialist in the Reagan White House. "Within six months, he was hosting suave dinner parties at his residence, which he parlayed into a formidable lobbying effort. He was particularly effective with the American Jewish community."

One of Hamdoon's favorite props, says Kemp, was a green Islamic scarf allegedly found on the body of an Iranian soldier. The scarf was decorated with a map of the Middle East showing a series of arrows pointing toward Jerusalem. Hamdoon used to "parade the scarf" to conferences and congressional hearings as proof that an Iranian victory over Iraq would result in "Israel becoming a victim along with the Arabs."

According to a sworn court affidavit prepared by Teicher in 1995, the United States "actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure Iraq had the military weaponry required." Teicher said in the affidavit that former CIA director William Casey used a Chilean company, Cardoen, to supply Iraq with cluster bombs that could be used to disrupt the Iranian human wave attacks. Teicher refuses to discuss the affidavit.

At the same time the Reagan administration was facilitating the supply of weapons and military components to Baghdad, it was attempting to cut off supplies to Iran under "Operation Staunch." Those efforts were largely successful, despite the glaring anomaly of the 1986 Iran-contra scandal when the White House publicly admitted trading arms for hostages, in violation of the policy that the United States was trying to impose on the rest of the world.

Although U.S. arms manufacturers were not as deeply involved as German or British companies in selling weaponry to Iraq, the Reagan administration effectively turned a blind eye to the export of "dual use" items such as chemical precursors and steel tubes that can have military and civilian applications. According to several former officials, the State and Commerce departments promoted trade in such items as a way to boost U.S. exports and acquire political leverage over Hussein.

When United Nations weapons inspectors were allowed into Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, they compiled long lists of chemicals, missile components, and computers from American suppliers, including such household names as Union Carbide and Honeywell, which were being used for military purposes.

A 1994 investigation by the Senate Banking Committee turned up dozens of biological agents shipped to Iraq during the mid-'80s under license from the Commerce Department, including various strains of anthrax, subsequently identified by the Pentagon as a key component of the Iraqi biological warfare program. The Commerce Department also approved the export of insecticides to Iraq, despite widespread suspicions that they were being used for chemical warfare.

The fact that Iraq was using chemical weapons was hardly a secret. In February 1984, an Iraqi military spokesman effectively acknowledged their use by issuing a chilling warning to Iran. "The invaders should know that for every harmful insect, there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it . . . and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide."

Chemicals Kill Kurds

In late 1987, the Iraqi air force began using chemical agents against Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq that had formed a loose alliance with Iran, according to State Department reports. The attacks, which were part of a "scorched earth" strategy to eliminate rebel-controlled villages, provoked outrage on Capitol Hill and renewed demands for sanctions against Iraq. The State Department and White House were also outraged -- but not to the point of doing anything that might seriously damage relations with Baghdad.

"The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our long-term political and economic objectives," Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy wrote in a September 1988 memorandum that addressed the chemical weapons question. "We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis."

Bush administration spokesmen have cited Hussein's use of chemical weapons "against his own people" -- and particularly the March 1988 attack on the Kurdish village of Halabjah -- to bolster their argument that his regime presents a "grave and gathering danger" to the United States.

The Iraqis continued to use chemical weapons against the Iranians until the end of the Iran-Iraq war. A U.S. air force intelligence officer, Rick Francona, reported finding widespread use of Iraqi nerve gas when he toured the Al Faw peninsula in southern Iraq in the summer of 1988, after its recapture by the Iraqi army. The battlefield was littered with atropine injectors used by panicky Iranian troops as an antidote against Iraqi nerve gas attacks.

Far from declining, the supply of U.S. military intelligence to Iraq actually expanded in 1988, according to a 1999 book by Francona, "Ally to Adversary: an Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace." Informed sources said much of the battlefield intelligence was channeled to the Iraqis by the CIA office in Baghdad.

Although U.S. export controls to Iraq were tightened up in the late 1980s, there were still many loopholes. In December 1988, Dow Chemical sold $1.5 million of pesticides to Iraq, despite U.S. government concerns that they could be used as chemical warfare agents. An Export-Import Bank official reported in a memorandum that he could find "no reason" to stop the sale, despite evidence that the pesticides were "highly toxic" to humans and would cause death "from asphyxiation."

The U.S. policy of cultivating Hussein as a moderate and reasonable Arab leader continued right up until he invaded Kuwait in August 1990, documents show. When the then-U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, met with Hussein on July 25, 1990, a week before the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, she assured him that Bush "wanted better and deeper relations," according to an Iraqi transcript of the conversation. "President Bush is an intelligent man," the ambassador told Hussein, referring to the father of the current president. "He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq."

"Everybody was wrong in their assessment of Saddam," said Joe Wilson, Glaspie's former deputy at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, and the last U.S. official to meet with Hussein. "Everybody in the Arab world told us that the best way to deal with Saddam was to develop a set of economic and commercial relationships that would have the effect of moderating his behavior. History will demonstrate that this was a miscalculation."

[GioFX]

“We should constantly be reviewing our policies, constantly be looking at those sanctions to make sure that they have directed that purpose. That purpose is every bit as important now as it was 10 years ago when we began it. And frankly, they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors.”

Colin Powell, Secretary of State - February 24, 2001


“But in terms of Saddam Hussein being there, let's remember that his country is divided, in effect. He does not control the northern part of his country. We are able to keep arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt.”

Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor - July 29, 2001


“I--I would take the use of force very seriously. I would be guarded in my approach. I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we commit our troops. The vice president [Al Gore] and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation building. I--I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and, therefore, prevent war from happening in the first place. And so I take my--I take my--my responsibility seriously.”

George W. Bush - October 3, 2000

[GioFX]

Bush su Osama Bin Laden

"I want justice. And there's an old poster out West, I recall, that says, 'Wanted: Dead or Alive.'"

George W. Bush, on Osama Bin Laden, 09/17/01


"I don't know where he is.You know, I just don't spend that much time on him... I truly am not that concerned about him."

George W. Bush, Press Conference, 3/13/02


Bush su Al Qaeda e Saddam Hussein

You can't distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror."

George W. Bush, 9/25/02


"We've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved in Sept. 11."

George W. Bush, 9/17/03


Bush sulla Guerra al Terrore

"One of the interesting things people ask me, now that we're asking questions, is, can you ever win the war on terror? Of course, you can."

George W. Bush, 4/13/04


"I don't think you can win [the war on terror]."

George W. Bush, 8/30/04


"Make no mistake about it, we are winning and we will win [the war on terror]."

George W. Bush, 8/31/04

[GioFX]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto
perchè se Saddam non le aveva, ha deliberatamente disatteso le (16) risoluzioni dell'Onu?

Perchè Israele ha disatteso 65 risoluzioni dell'ONU dal 1967?

Perchè altri pesei hanno disatteso molte senza subire conseguenze?

Perchè ha cacciato gli ispettori nel '98? Perchè ha sviluppato missili con una gittata più lunga di quella consentita? se il suo obiettivo non era nascondere le ADM, ma sfidare gli Usa, ci è riuscito. Gli è andata male, ha perso. E allora, qual'è il problema?

Perchè quando Saddam aveve e usava le WMD nessuno ha alzato un dito?

Perchè se Saddam aveva le WMD, così tante sia biologiche che batteriologiche come descritto dettagliatamente nei rapporti di Washington e presentati al SC, gli ispettori fino all'interruzione forzata del loro lavoro a causa della fretta americana di invadere, non avevano trovato uno straccio di armamento?

Perchè se Saddam aveva avviato un programma di riammo dopo il 1990 non ha mai utilizzato queste WMD?

Perchè Saddam non ha usato le WMD durante la recente guerra?

La comunità internazionale avrebbe dovuto piegarsi di fronte alle provocazioni di Saddam? creare il precedente (come a Monaco nel '38) di potersi fare beffe degli obblighi internazionali? Si accomodi, chi vuole fare sua questa tesi. Ma ricordi: Saddam era anni che non adempiva alle risoluzioni Onu, che prevedevano termmini temporali precisi per essere soddisfatte. E il rinvio era di per sè una violazione delle risoluzioni Onu.

Il punto che tu non vuoi vedere è che se un'effetto positivo hanno avuto le sanzioni sono state anche quello di impedire il riarmo del paese... e si è visto da come è stato facile la guerra fino al 1 maggio.

[GioFX]

Originariamente inviato da jumpermax
e i motivi per cui volevi fosse rimosso nel 91 sono venuti meno col passare degli anni?

Assolutamente no.

Peccato che nel 1991 si potesse farlo anche con la forza, dato che ormai era già in corso una guerra, mentre nel 2003 si poteva cercare di fare di tutto per evitarla, cosa che ovviamente non è stata fatta perchè, altrettanto ovviamente, non erano quella la motivazioni principale.

[fek]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto
tipo la seconda guerra mondiale?
milioni di morti per il tornaconto economico dell'america
tipo il piano marshall insomma...

Il piano Marshal fu un investimento che pago' nei successivi 50 anni anni: l'obiettivo fu ricostruire un mercato in Europa da "invadere" con prodotti americani, sfruttando la posizione di nazione vincitrice del conflitto per ridisegnare l'equilibrio politico ed economico nel vecchio continente.
Solo di recente Francia e Germania stanno cercando di staccarsi dai legami imposti dal piano Marshal con l'economia americana.

Ho un ottimo libro che descrive il piano e le sue ripercussioni sull'economia europea, se sei interessato all'argomento.

[fek]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto
se la tua preoccupazione va alle migliaia di persone morte, sappi che banalmente, secondo un calcolo statistico che quando trovo linko, ne morivano di piu in iraq in tempo di "pace"

A causa delle sanzioni imposte e controllate da USA e GB.

non ho detto che fossero "CERTI", ho detto che non c'era la certezza che le armi fossero state smantellate...

No. Nel '96 c'era la certezza che il 95% delle armi nucleari, biologiche e chimiche fossero state distrutte dai commissari dell'ONU.
Del restante 5% non si aveva traccia, e non c'e' stata conferma di distruzione, il che non voleva dire che non esistessero, ne' voleva dire che queste armi esistessero.
Inoltre, e' interessante notare che sia le armi chimiche sia quelle biologiche diventavano inservibili dopo circa 4 anni (praticamente era come sparare testate riempite di borotalco).

Fonte:
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/...411812-6877454

L'autore del libro, Scot Ritter, era il secondo in carica dell'UNSCOMM ed e' un repubblicano che voto' Bush nel 2000.

[fek]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto E il rinvio era di per sè una violazione delle risoluzioni Onu.

Violazione che non autorizzava legalmente l'uso della forza. L'intervento armato e' stato quindi illegale, giusto o non giusto, non posso essere io a giudicarlo.
E' stato semplicemente illegale e come tale da condannare. Se poi si aggiunge che si e' appoggiato su notizie false, ed ha avuto motivi puramente economici (ed in parte geopolitici), il quadro' e completo.

[flisi71]

Originariamente inviato da Bet
ah ecco! pero' noi, cioè voi o altri, state sempre a discutere come si il problema siano la presenza di ste armi...
anche perchè il problema non è quella di una tremenda bugia contro una serie di lampanti verità, ma un insieme di colossali balle raccontate da posizioni opposte per sostenere posizioni diverse......

Ciao Bet, secondo me il problema invece è importante, perchè la presidenza bush ha ottenuto l'appoggio dell'opinione pubblica del suo paese (che conta moltissimo) solo grazie a dossier manipolati, con notizie false, palesemente false.
Senza avere il consenso degli americani non avrebbe mai potuto intraprendere la campagna iraquena, con tutte le infauste conseguenze.
E questo consenso appunto è stato ottenuto con notizie manipolate e false. Con un pò di ragionamento era lecito avere dubbi, ma in genere la massa abbocca bene agli slogan e aborrisce i ragionamenti più lunghi di 10 parole; questo è un comportamento ben conosciuto dai pubblicitari e vale in ogni parte del mondo: anche qui sul forum c'erano i "pasionari" che si stracciavano le vesti sul pericolo imminente delle armi di Saddam, pur non essendo esperti di armi, te ne ricordi, vero?


Che il mondo adesso sia più sicuro di prima lo credono ormai in pochi.
Scusa se questo ti sembra poco importante.

Ciao

Federico

[Paracleto]

ho trovato questo

[mrmic]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto
ho trovato questo

Interessante, ma come avrai avuto modo di leggere non è che serva molto ad avvalorare la tua posizione
"
We're talking about dozens of sites being dismantled," a diplomat said on condition of anonymity. "Large numbers of buildings taken down, warehouses were emptied and removed. This would require heavy machinery, demolition equipment. This is not something that you'd do overnight."

Diplomats in Vienna say the IAEA is worried that these facilities, which belonged to Saddam's pre-1991 covert nuclear weapons program, could have been packed up and sold to a country or militants interested in nuclear weapons.
"

Si parla di vendite ad altri Stati di materiale e capacità costruttive già rese innocue.

"It seems extremely negligent for the authorities in Iraq to allow this quantity of material to have been exported from the country," Standish said.

...no comment, si stupiscone che dall' Iraq possa uscire, o possa essere entrata roba senza averne preso conoscenza...

After returning in November 2002 until they were evacuated in March 2003, the IAEA was confident none of the dual-use nuclear equipment in Iraq was being used in a weapons program.

[Paracleto]

Originariamente inviato da mrmic
Interessante, ma come avrai avuto modo di leggere non è che serva molto ad avvalorare la tua posizione
"
We're talking about dozens of sites being dismantled," a diplomat said on condition of anonymity. "Large numbers of buildings taken down, warehouses were emptied and removed. This would require heavy machinery, demolition equipment. This is not something that you'd do overnight."

Diplomats in Vienna say the IAEA is worried that these facilities, which belonged to Saddam's pre-1991 covert nuclear weapons program, could have been packed up and sold to a country or militants interested in nuclear weapons.
"

Si parla di vendite ad altri Stati di materiale e capacità costruttive già rese innocue.

"It seems extremely negligent for the authorities in Iraq to allow this quantity of material to have been exported from the country," Standish said.

...no comment, si stupiscone che dall' Iraq possa uscire, o possa essere entrata roba senza averne preso conoscenza...

After returning in November 2002 until they were evacuated in March 2003, the IAEA was confident none of the dual-use nuclear equipment in Iraq was being used in a weapons program.

si parla di armi e componenti venduti a Stati interessati al nucleare, di materiale presente in iraq che se n'è uscito

un poco pochino la mia tesi c'entra...

[von Clausewitz]

Originariamente inviato da fek
Il piano Marshal fu un investimento che pago' nei successivi 50 anni anni: l'obiettivo fu ricostruire un mercato in Europa da "invadere" con prodotti americani, sfruttando la posizione di nazione vincitrice del conflitto per ridisegnare l'equilibrio politico ed economico nel vecchio continente.
Solo di recente Francia e Germania stanno cercando di staccarsi dai legami imposti dal piano Marshal con l'economia americana.

Ho un ottimo libro che descrive il piano e le sue ripercussioni sull'economia europea, se sei interessato all'argomento.

il piano Marshall fu ideato dagli americani essenzialmente per due motivi

1) perchè gli americani, che nel dopoguerra si occuparono della parte d'europa da loro liberata, dovettero soddisfare i bisogni materiali d'intere nazioni sconvolte e distrutte e le cui poloplazioni erano decimate e impoverite, non avevano intenzione di assolvere a questa funzione di tutore troppo a lungo o più di quanto fosse necessario
nel 1945 addirittura un intera armata la 15a, man mano che si procedeva nella conquista della germania, era adibita ad assolvere le funzioni logistiche e di approvigionamento della popolazione locale

2) perchè un europa di nuovo forte, rifiorita era anche nel loro interesse, cioè nel senso che così sarebbe stata meno esposta al ricatto della potenza sovietica

questo piano fu proposto anche ai paesi dell'est, ma fu bloccato dal veto di mosca, mentre anche in oriente gli americani provvedevano agli aiuti e incoraggiavano le rifrome in paesi a struttura medievale come corea e giappone
tutti questi paesi diventeranno dei modelli di sviluppo economico (basti pensare cosa rappresentarono la germania ovest e il giappone ) e i principali concorrenti economici e commerciali degli stessi USA
ma cosa vorrai staccare e staccare, che l'europa senza il mercato americano, suo principale export, fallisce
il libro in questione lo puoi anche tenere per te, non mi sembra il caso che faccia partecipi anche noi dellle incomensurabili fregnacce in esso scritte