380 tonnellate di esplosivo convenzionale

[Paracleto]

Originariamente inviato da GioFX
si è rivelata infondata?!? ma hai letto il documento UFFICIALE fotocopiato? certo, infondata solo perchè un sito di destra che riprende il giornale più conservatore di tutti che da una propria opinonione sul valore di 380 tonnellate di armi su molte di più che secondo loro i soldati americani avrebbero sequestrato... ma fammi il piacere!

anche ABCè filonazista?


"non sappiamo i fatti"

ma giofx si
lui li sa

mi piace un casino che uelli che dicevano che le armi non c'erano ora dicono che c'erano (e viceversa)

[Korn]

paracleto paracleto, quello che dice è un cazzata e lo sai, perchè provochi così gratuitamente?

[Paracleto]

Originariamente inviato da Korn
paracleto paracleto, quello che dice è un cazzata e lo sai, perchè provochi così gratuitamente?

provoco?
dove?

[Korn]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto

mi piace un casino che uelli che dicevano che le armi non c'erano ora dicono che c'erano (e viceversa)

[Paracleto]

perchè?
dove sta la provocazione?

le armi non c'erano
ecco, sono sparite le armi sotto gli occhi di quei mammalucchi degli americani

non lo sto mica dicendo io

[GioFX]

anacleto, ma ci sei o ci fai?!?

parliamo di armi non convenzionali chimiche, batteriologiche e nucleari (quelle che la casa bianca chiama Weapons of Mass Destruction) o armi convenzionali?

Vediamo se ci arrivi...

[Lucio Virzì]

Originariamente inviato da GioFX
anacleto, ma ci sei o ci fai?!?

parliamo di armi non convenzionali chimiche, batteriologiche e nucleari (quelle che la casa bianca chiama Weapons of Mass Destruction) o armi convenzionali?

Vediamo se ci arrivi...

Appunto.

[Paracleto]

Originariamente inviato da Lucio Virzì
D'accordo, si cercavano le WOMD, le armi chimiche, le batteriologiche.. ma levargli ste 380 tonnellate di esplosivo ad alto potenziale sembrava brutto?

10:10 Scomparse 380 tonnellate esplosivo da deposito
Il governo iracheno ad interim ha avvertito gli Stati Uniti e gli ispettori internazionali nucleari della scomparsa di quasi 380 tonnellate di un potente esplosivo convenzionale usato per abbattere edifici, realizzare testate missilistiche e far detonare armi nucleari. Lo scrive oggi il New York Times, spiegando che l'esplosivo si trovava in un deposito del centro militare iracheno di al Qaqaa, ormai abbandonato, dove ancora ieri erano in azione saccheggiatori.

LuVi

vediamo se ci arrivate da soli

[GioFX]

beh certo, hanno trovato dell'esplosivo che può essere utilizzato anche per relaizzare una bomba H, ma allora, anche il titanio usato negli armamenti convenzionali può essere utilizzato per le WMD... mhhh, com'è che non ho sentito alcun giubilo di gioia da parte di Bush? com'è che i servizi segreti che avevano confermato di non aver trovato un tubo non hanno detto nulla in merito a questo caso?

[Paracleto]

Originariamente inviato da GioFX
beh certo, hanno trovato dell'esplosivo che può essere utilizzato anche per relaizzare una bomba H, ma allora, anche il titanio usato negli armamenti convenzionali può essere utilizzato per le WMD... mhhh, com'è che non ho sentito alcun giubilo di gioia da parte di Bush? com'è che i servizi segreti che avevano confermato di non aver trovato un tubo non hanno detto nulla in merito a questo caso?

com'è che non lo hanno mai detto, di non avere trovato un tubo?
c'erano dei rapporti ben chiari, e non è nemmeno questione di secoli fa

[GioFX]

Originariamente inviato da Paracleto
com'è che non lo hanno mai detto, di non avere trovato un tubo?
c'erano dei rapporti ben chiari, e non è nemmeno questione di secoli fa

Ma stai scherzando, dico, vero?!?

http://forum.hwupgrade.it/showthread...d&pagenumber=4

CNN.com

Official: No WMD stockpiles in Iraq

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Contradicting the main argument for a war that has cost more than 1,000 American lives, the top U.S. arms inspector reported Wednesday that he found no evidence that Iraq produced any weapons of mass destruction after 1991. He also concluded that Saddam Hussein's weapons capability weakened during a dozen years of U.N. sanctions before the U.S. invasion last year.

Contrary to prewar statements by President Bush and top administration officials, Saddam did not have chemical and biological stockpiles when the war began and his nuclear capabilities were deteriorating, not advancing, according to the report by Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group.

Duelfer's findings come less than four weeks before an election in which Bush's handling of Iraq has become the central issue. Democratic candidate John Kerry has seized on comments this week by the former U.S. administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, that the United States didn't have enough troops in Iraq to prevent a breakdown in security after Saddam was toppled.

The inspector's report could boost Kerry's contention that Bush rushed to war based on faulty intelligence and that sanctions and U.N. weapons inspectors should have been given more time.

Saddam a threat
But Duelfer also supports Bush's argument that Saddam remained a threat. Interviews with the toppled leader and other former Iraqi officials made clear to inspectors that Saddam had not lost his ambition to pursue weapons of mass destruction and hoped to revive his weapons program if U.N. sanctions were lifted, the report said.

"There was a risk, a real risk, that Saddam Hussein would pass weapons or materials or information to terrorist networks," Bush said in a campaign speech in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania, defending the decision to invade. "In the world after Sept. 11, that was a risk we could not afford to take."

A top Democrat in Congress, Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, said Duelfer's findings undercut the two main arguments for war: that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and that he would share them with terrorists like al-Qaeda.

"We did not go to war because Saddam had future intentions to obtain weapons of mass destruction," Levin said.

Traveling in Africa, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said Wednesday that the report shows that Saddam was "doing his best" to get around the United Nations' sanctions. For months, Blair has been trying to defend his justification for joining the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in the face of heavy criticism from some in his own party.

Duelfer presented his findings in a report of more than 1,000 pages, and in appearances before Senate committees.

The report avoids direct comparisons with prewar claims by the Bush administration on Iraq's weapons systems. But Duelfer largely reinforces the conclusions of his predecessor, David Kay, who said in January, "We were almost all wrong" on Saddam's weapons programs. The White House did not endorse Kay's findings then, noting that Duelfer's team was continuing to search for weapons.

Duelfer found that Saddam, hoping to end U.N. sanctions, gradually began ending prohibited weapons programs starting in 1991. But as Iraq started receiving money through the U.N. oil-for-food program in the late 1990s, and as enforcement of the sanctions weakened, Saddam was able to take steps to rebuild his military, such as acquiring parts for missile systems.

However, the erosion of sanctions stopped after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Duelfer found, preventing Saddam from pursuing weapons of mass destruction.

Duelfer's team found no written plans by Saddam's regime to pursue banned weapons if U.N. sanctions were lifted. Instead, the inspectors based their findings that Saddam hoped to reconstitute his programs on interviews with Saddam after his capture, as well as talks with other top Iraqi officials.

The inspectors found Saddam was particularly concerned about the threat posed by Iran, the country's enemy in a 1980-88 war. Saddam said he would meet Iran's threat by any means necessary, which Duelfer understood to mean weapons of mass destruction.

Saddam believed the use of chemical weapons against Iran prevented Iraq's defeat in that war. He also was prepared to use such weapons in 1991 if the U.S.-led coalition had tried to topple him in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Tuesday that Saddam "had the intent and capability" to build weapons of mass destruction, and that he was "a gathering threat that needed to be taken seriously, that it was a matter of time before he was going to begin pursuing those weapons of mass destruction."

But before the war, the Bush administration cast Saddam as an immediate threat, not a gathering threat who would begin pursuing weapons in the future.

For example, Bush said in October 2002 that "Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more." Bush also said then, "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program."

Sen. Richard Durbin, D-Illinois, said Wednesday that Duelfer's findings showed there is "no evidence whatsoever of the threats we were warned about." He spoke after Duelfer gave a closed-door briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Committee Chairman Pat Roberts, R-Kansas, said Duelfer showed Iraq's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction had degraded since 1998. But Roberts called the report inconclusive on what happened to weapons stockpiles Saddam is believed to have once possessed.

Interviews with Saddam left Duelfer's team with the impression that Saddam was more concerned about Iran and Israel as enemies than he was about the United States. Saddam appeared to hold out hope that U.S. leaders would ultimately recognize that it was in the country's interest to deal with Iraq as an important, secular, oil-rich Middle Eastern nation, the report found.

The Iraq Survey Group will continue operations and may prepare smaller reports on issues that remain unresolved, including whether weapons had been smuggled out of Iraq and about intelligence that Saddam had mobile biological weapons labs.

----

U.S. Weapons Inspector: Iraq Had No WMD

By KATHERINE PFLEGER SHRADER, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON - Fallen Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (news - web sites) did not have stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, but left signs that he had idle programs he someday hoped to revive, the top U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq (news - web sites) concludes in a draft report due out soon.
According to people familiar with the 1,500-page report, the head of the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, will find that Saddam was importing banned materials, working on unmanned aerial vehicles in violation of U.N. agreements and maintaining a dual-use industrial sector that could produce weapons.

Duelfer also says Iraq only had small research and development programs for chemical and biological weapons.

As Duelfer puts the finishing touches on his report, he concludes Saddam had intentions of restarting weapons programs at some point, after suspicion and inspections from the international community waned.

After a year and a half in Iraq, however, the United States has found no weapons of mass destruction — its chief argument for going to war and overthrowing the regime.

An intelligence official said Duelfer could wrap up the report as soon as this month, but noted it may take time to declassify it. Those who discussed the report inside and outside the government did so Thursday on the condition of anonymity because it contains classified material and is not yet completed.

If the report is released publicly before the Nov. 2 elections, Democrats are likely to seize on the document as another opportunity to criticize the Bush administration's leading argument for war in Iraq and the deteriorating security situation there.

Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry (news - web sites) has criticized the president's handling of the war, but also has said he still would have voted to authorize the invasion even if he had known no weapons of mass destruction would be found there.

Duelfer's report is expected to be similar to findings reported by his predecessor, David Kay, who presented an interim report to Congress in October. Kay left the post in January, saying, "We were almost all wrong" about Saddam's weapons programs.

The new analysis, however, is expected to fall between the position of the Bush administration before the war — portraying Saddam as a grave threat — and the declarative statements Kay made after he resigned.

It will also add more evidence and flesh out Kay's October findings. At that time, Kay said the Iraq Survey Group had only uncovered limited evidence of secret chemical and biological weapons programs, but he found substantial evidence of an Iraqi push to boost the range of its ballistic missiles beyond prohibited ranges.

He also said there was almost no sign that a significant nuclear weapons project was under way.

Duelfer's report doesn't reach firm conclusions in all areas. For instance, U.S. officials are still investigating whether Saddam's fallen regime may have sent chemical weapons equipment and several billion dollars over the border to Syria. That has not been confirmed, but remains an area of interest to the U.S. government.

The Duelfer report will come months after the Senate Intelligence Committee released a scathing assessment of the prewar intelligence on Iraq.

After a yearlong inquiry, the Republican-led committee said in July the CIA (news - web sites) kept key information from its own and other agencies' analysts, engaged in "group think" by failing to challenge the assumption that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and allowed President Bush (news - web sites) and Secretary of State Colin Powell (news - web sites) to make false statements.

The Iraq Survey Group has been working since the summer of 2003 to find Saddam's weapons and better understand his prohibited programs. More than a thousand civilian and military weapons specialists, translators and other experts have been devoted to the effort.

----

Nytimes.com

Rumsfeld Sees Lack of Proof for Qaeda-Hussein Link

By THOM SHANKER

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday that he had seen no "strong, hard evidence" linking Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, although he tempered his comment by noting that stark disagreements on that issue remained among American intelligence analysts.

"I have seen the answer to that question migrate in the intelligence community over the period of a year in the most amazing way," Mr. Rumsfeld said when asked about ties between Mr. Hussein and the terror network run by Osama bin Laden. Senior administration officials cited the existence of ties between them as a rationale for war on Iraq.

"Second, there are differences in the intelligence community as to what the relationship was," Mr. Rumsfeld said at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "To my knowledge, I have not seen any strong, hard evidence that links the two."

Relationships among terrorists and terrorist networks are complicated to track, Mr. Rumsfeld said, because "in many cases, they cooperate not in a chain of command but in a loose affiliation, a franchising arrangement almost."

He said that even Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born terrorist leader blamed for some of the most violent attacks inside Iraq since the end of major combat operations, probably had no formal allegiance to Mr. bin Laden, although "they're just two peas in a pod in terms of what they're doing."

The extent of Iraq's ties to Al Qaeda has been subjected to intense and often contentious scrutiny, especially this campaign season. While Mr. Rumsfeld often has cited C.I.A. reports of murky ties, including the presence of Qaeda operatives in Iraq, he has not been as adamant on the issue as other senior administration officials, in particular Vice President Dick Cheney.

"There is no question but that there have been interactions between the Iraqi government, Iraqi officials and Al Qaeda operatives," Mr. Rumsfeld said in November 2002. "They have occurred over a span of some 8 or 10 years to our knowledge. There are currently Al Qaeda in Iraq.''

But even when discussing intelligence pointing to Iraq- Qaeda links, he has noted the absence of certainty. In September 2002, he warned that it was not always possible for the government to satisfy a public desire for "some hard evidence" of Iraq's ties to terrorist networks. "We have to face that fact that we're not going to have everything beyond a reasonable doubt," he said.

Mr. Rumsfeld's comments were made one day before Mr. Cheney is to meet Senator John Edwards in a vice-presidential campaign debate, during which the topic of administration statements on Iraq-Qaeda ties are likely to come up.

Mr. Rumsfeld issued a statement late last night in which he stated, "I have acknowledged since September 2002 that there were ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq."

That assessment, he said in the statement, was based on points provided by George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, to describe the C.I.A.'s understanding of the Qaeda-Iraq relationship. Those points, Mr. Rumsfeld said, included evidence of Qaeda members in Iraq, reports of senior-level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda going back a decade and of possible chemical and biological agent training, and of information that Iraq and Al Qaeda discussed safe haven opportunities in Iraq.

In his speech yesterday, Mr. Rumsfeld praised a weekend offensive by the First Infantry Division and members of the new Iraqi security force that chased insurgents from Samarra. He said the offensive should serve as a warning to other guerrillas holding territory before elections scheduled for January.

In the face of a tenacious insurgency, he said, "your first choice is to talk and to gather people together.

"And that's what they tried in some areas, and it worked, and in some areas it didn't," he added. "And the next thing you have to do is have the threat of force. And finally you may have to use force. And that's what happened in Samarra."

Mr. Rumsfeld also gave an impassioned defense of President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan for his actions in support of the military effort to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan and for serving as a voice of moderation in the Muslim world.

----

Nytimes.com:

Final 9/11 Report Is Said to Dismiss Iraq-Qaeda Alliance

By PHILIP SHENON

Published: July 12, 2004

WASHINGTON, July 11 - The commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks is nearing completion of a final, probably unanimous report that will stand by the conclusions of the panel's staff and largely dismiss White House theories both about a close working relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda and about possible Iraqi involvement in Sept. 11, commission officials said.

The report, which is expected to be made public several days before the panel's mandated deadline of July 26, will also probably be unwelcome at the White House because it will document management failures at senior levels of the Bush administration that kept the government from acting aggressively on intelligence warnings in the spring and summer of 2001 of an imminent, catastrophic terrorist attack, the officials said.

Campaign advisers to Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, the presumed Democratic presidential nominee, have said they eagerly await the commission's report, believing it will damage President Bush by showing that he and his senior aides were inattentive to dire threats before Sept. 11 and may have misled the nation about the reasons for the war in Iraq.

At the commission's request, the White House in April declassified and made public an intelligence report given to Mr. Bush on Aug. 6, 2001 - 36 days before the attacks - that was titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S."

Commission members said the final report would not single out government officials by name for intelligence or law enforcement blunders before Sept. 11. But they said the report would criticize several agencies for their performance in both the Bush and Clinton administrations, especially the F.B.I. and the C.I.A., and call for an overhaul of the nation's counterterrorism efforts.

The officials declined to detail the report's recommendations but said they would call for a shakeup of the F.B.I.'s domestic counterintelligence program and for equally broad changes at the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies, possibly by adding to the authority of the director of central intelligence to oversee the work of agencies beyond the C.I.A.

The panel's expected call for change at the C.I.A. would be bolstered by the findings of a Senate intelligence committee report that was made public on Friday, which blamed the agency for systematically exaggerating the evidence that Iraq had stockpiled chemical and biological weapons and was pursuing nuclear arms, the central justification for last year's invasion.

"We don't need to point fingers in our report, because people will be able to judge the facts for themselves," said John F. Lehman, a Republican commissioner who was Navy secretary in the Reagan administration.

Mr. Lehman has said that he expects the commission's work to result in "revolutionary" changes in the government's intelligence community. "The editorializing has shrunk and shrunk and shrunk as the facts before us have expanded and expanded and expanded," he said.

Timothy J. Roemer, a Democratic commissioner who is a former House member from Indiana, said he expected the final report to be unanimous and to call for "dynamic and dramatic changes in the intelligence community - changes in tradecraft and also nuts-and-bolts changes."

The panel's staff created controversy last month with an interim report that largely discounted theories about close ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda, another major justification cited by the Bush administration for invading Iraq.

The staff report found that there was "no credible evidence that Iraq and Al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States" and that repeated contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda "do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship."

The staff also said that it did not believe a widely circulated report from Czech intelligence that a ringleader of the Sept. 11 attacks met in Prague with an Iraqi intelligence officer in April 2001, suggesting Iraqi involvement in the attacks.

The findings were in marked contrast to statements by President Bush and, more often, Vice President Dick Cheney, who has been the administration's lead spokesman in arguing that an alliance existed between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

Though Mr. Cheney insisted that he had no major differences with the commission and that the debate was being mischaracterized in news reports, the vice president responded to the staff report last month by telling a television interviewer that "there clearly was a relationship" between President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Al Qaeda and that "the evidence is overwhelming," noting that he "probably" had access to intelligence information not reviewed by the commission. He also insisted that the Czech intelligence report might be credible.

Despite initial suggestions from the commission's leaders that they might rewrite the staff report to limit its conclusions that discounted a possible Iraq-Qaeda tie, commission members and the panel's chief spokesman said last week that the panel had decided to stand by the staff in the final report.

That reasoning was bolstered last week by the findings of the Senate intelligence committee, which cited several classified intelligence reviews prepared by the C.I.A. after Sept. 11 that suggested that evidence of a close relation between Iraq and Al Qaeda was "murky" and at times contradictory. The Senate committee said the C.I.A. had "reasonably concluded" that contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda "did not add up to an established formal relationship" between Mr. Hussein and the terror network.

''We believe we have seen everything now that the vice president has seen and we continue to stand on the staff statements," said Al Felzenberg, a commission spokesman.

He suggested that the commission's final report would go further than interim staff reports in documenting contacts over the years between Iraqi government and military officials and Al Qaeda's leadership. This may placate the White House to some extent by showing extensive communication between Iraq and Qaeda leaders.

"We expect the final report to enumerate on some of the contacts that were made between Iraq and Al Qaeda, and there were a number of points of contacts,'' Mr. Felzenberg said.

Commission members met in Washington last week to decide on the final wording of several chapters of the report. Several said afterward that they were increasingly optimistic that any differences between the five Democratic and five Republican members could be set aside and that they could agree on a unanimous report and on recommendations for overhauling the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and other counterterrorism agencies.

They noted, however, that they had not concluded their deliberations of some of the central policy recommendations, and that those issues were so contentious that they could prove to be a stumbling block to a unanimous report.

''We're still working through final iterations, but I think that on the main points, there seems to be consensus,'' said Richard Ben-Veniste, the former Watergate prosecutor who is a Democratic member of the panel. ''This commission operates on a very collegial basis, and I have found that talking through these issues has produced much more that we find in common than in opposition.'' Mr. Roemer said his "optimism is growing every day" about the possibility of a unanimous report.

The commission is trying to complete its work and publish the final report sometime during the week of July 18, to avoid being overshadowed by news from the Democratic convention, which opens on July 26.

Mr. Felzenberg said that the White House - through the office of Andrew H. Card Jr., President Bush's chief of staff - appeared ready to move quickly to declassify chapters of the report as they are completed by the commission. "I can say it's going smoothly," he said.

Under a procedure established by the commission last year, the White House has reviewed and declassified 17 interim staff reports released by the commission at a series of public hearings since January.

The commission has said that as it completes chapters of its final report, they will be given to the White House for a final security review. Commission officials said that since so much of the final report is built upon information in interim reports that have already been declassified, the final review process would be relatively straightforward.

Mr. Felzenberg said that the commission's staff investigators had essentially finished their work, though they would keep gathering information until shortly before publication of the final report.

The White House said last week that Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser, had recently provided the panel with written answers to a final set of questions submitted by the commission. The White House and the commission would not describe the issues raised by the panel in its questions to Ms. Rice.

[Paracleto]

dunque

senza essere esperti di statistica (ma applicando il semplice buon senso) non è difficile rendersi conto dell'assurdità di quel dato. Se poi si maneggiano bene numeri e percentuali si è in grado di smontarlo ancor più efficacemente: è il caso - tra gli altri - di Shannon Love (qui e qui) e di Fred Kaplan (qui). Se a questo punto qualcuno decidesse di fidarsi delle cifre dell'Iraq Body Count (più ragionevoli senza dubbio ma non per questo reali), farebbe meglio a leggersi prima i quattro post a confutazione che David Adesnik ha dedicato questa settimana alla sua metodologia di calcolo (one, two, three, four).


Slate spiega perché lo scoop del New York Times non è vero

ovviamente, ripeto, quella dell'esplosivo si è rivelata l'ennesima vaccata, il pentagono ha detto di avercelo in mano, ma i media italiani controllati da berlusconi filtrano questo genere di messaggi che potrebbero essere dannosi per il governo in carica...

[GioFX]

ma perchè mai dovrei credere a dei blogger più di una testata giornalistica?

[GioFX]

Originariamente inviato da Proteus
Per una semplice questione di aritmetica e buonsenso, quando le notizie descrivono eventi esagerati ed assai improbabili, anche se statisticamente possibili ma con margini ridicoli, divengono sospette.

Cosa sarebbe esagerato ed improbabile, il documento del governo Allawi?

Prendiamo un evento a caso: terremoto in Turchia: 12.000 morti. Un sito qualsiasi dice che sono troppi e spara una cifra di 2.000, devo dar ragione a quest'ultimo?!?

[GioFX]

quindi il documento per te è falso?

[Paracleto]

edit
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