si, grsecurity (che continene anche pax) serve in gran parte anche a questo.
poi fa un sacco di belle cosine:
grsecurity 2.0 RBAC features
* Role-Based Access Control
* User, group, and special roles
* Domain support for users and groups
* Role transition tables
* IP-based roles
* Non-root access to special roles
* Special roles that require no authentication
* Nested subjects
* Variable support in configuration
* And, or, and difference set operations on variables in configuration
* Object mode that controls the creation of setuid and setgid files
* Create and delete object modes
* Kernel interpretation of inheritance
* Real-time regular-expression resolution
* Ability to deny ptraces to specific processes
* User and group transition checking and enforcement on an inclusive or exclusive basis
* /dev/grsec entry for kernel authentication and learning logs
* Next-generation code that produces least-privilege policies for the entire system with no configuration
* Full pathnames for offending process and parent process
* RBAC status function for gradm
* /proc/<pid>/ipaddr gives the remote address of the person who started a given process
* Secure policy enforcement
* Supports read, write, append, execute, view, and read-only ptrace object permissions
* Supports hide, protect, and override subject flags
* Supports the PaX flags
* Shared memory protection feature
* Integrated local attack response on all alerts
* Subject flag that ensures a process can never execute trojaned code
* Full-featured fine-grained auditing
* Resource, socket, and capability support
* Protection against exploit bruteforcing
* /proc/pid filedescriptor/memory protection
* Rules can be placed on non-existent files/processes
* Policy regeneration on subjects and objects
* Configurable log suppression
* Configurable process accounting
* Human-readable configuration
* Not filesystem or architecture dependent
* Scales well: supports as many policies as memory can handle with the same performance hit
* No runtime memory allocation
* SMP safe
* O(1) time efficiency for most operations
* Include directive for specifying additional policies
* Enable, disable, reload capabilities
* Option to hide kernel processes
Chroot restrictions
* No attaching shared memory outside of chroot
* No kill outside of chroot
* No ptrace outside of chroot (architecture independent)
* No capget outside of chroot
* No setpgid outside of chroot
* No getpgid outside of chroot
* No getsid outside of chroot
* No sending of signals by fcntl outside of chroot
* No viewing of any process outside of chroot, even if /proc is mounted
* No mounting or remounting
* No pivot_root
* No double chroot
* No fchdir out of chroot
* Enforced chdir("/") upon chroot
* No (f)chmod +s
* No mknod
* No sysctl writes
* No raising of scheduler priority
* No connecting to abstract unix domain sockets outside of chroot
* Removal of harmful privileges via capabilities
* Exec logging within chroot
Address space modification protection
* PaX: Page-based implementation of non-executable user pages for i386, sparc, sparc64, alpha, parisc, amd64, ia64, and ppc; negligible performance hit on all i386 CPUs but Pentium 4
* PaX: Segmentation-based implementation of non-executable user pages for i386 with no performance hit
* PaX: Segmentation-based implementation of non-executable KERNEL pages for i386
* PaX: Mprotect restrictions prevent new code from entering a task
* PaX: Randomization of stack and mmap base for i386, sparc, sparc64, alpha, parisc, amd64, ia64, ppc, and mips
* PaX: Randomization of heap base for i386, sparc, sparc64, alpha, parisc, amd64, ia64, ppc, and mips
* PaX: Randomization of executable base for i386, sparc, sparc64, alpha, parisc, amd64, ia64, and ppc
* PaX: Randomization of kernel stack
* PaX: Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines (for libc5, glibc 2.0, uClibc, Modula-3 compatibility)
* PaX: No ELF .text relocations
* PaX: Trampoline emulation (GCC and linux sigreturn)
* PaX: PLT emulation for non-i386 archs
* No kernel modification via /dev/mem, /dev/kmem, or /dev/port
* Option to disable use of raw I/O
* Removal of addresses from /proc/<pid>/[maps|stat]
Auditing features
* Option to specify single group to audit
* Exec logging with arguments
* Denied resource logging
* Chdir logging
* Mount and unmount logging
* IPC creation/removal logging
* Signal logging
* Failed fork logging
* Time change logging
Randomization features
* Larger entropy pools
* Randomized TCP Initial Sequence Numbers
* Randomized PIDs
* Randomized IP IDs
* Randomized TCP source ports
* Randomized RPC XIDs
Other features
* /proc restrictions that don't leak information about process owners
* Symlink/hardlink restrictions to prevent /tmp races
* FIFO restrictions
* Dmesg(8) restriction
* Enhanced implementation of Trusted Path Execution
* GID-based socket restrictions
* Nearly all options are sysctl-tunable, with a locking mechanism
* All alerts and audits support a feature that logs the IP address of the attacker with the log
* Stream connections across unix domain sockets carry the attacker's IP address with them (on 2.4 only)
* Detection of local connections: copies attacker's IP address to the other task
* Automatic deterrence of exploit bruteforcing
* Low, Medium, High, and Custom security levels
* Tunable flood-time and burst for logging
:sofico:
mi sa che mi devo cercare una ragazza, ho un pò troppo tempo da perdere :D:cool: :sofico: